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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
the affidavits so as to justify defendant's request for summary relief. For this
reason and because of the factual issue apparent on the face of the affidavits,
the Court reversed the Appellate Division and denied defendant's motion to
dismiss.
Bd.
CORPORATIONS
PuBLIc POLICY TEST IN MEMBERSHIP CORPORATION CHARTER APPLICATIONS
OVERRULED

Section 10 of the Membership Corporations Law of New York provides
that five or more persons may become a membership corporation "for any
lawful purpose." In addition, however, the New York courts have required
that the purposes of the proposed membership corporation be in accord with
community interests and the public policy of the State. In Association for the
Preservation of Freedom of Choice, Inc. v. Shapiro,1 the Court of Appeals
rejected the public policy and community interest tests previously used by the
lower courts in deciding whether to approve applications for incorporation under
the Membership Corporations Law.
The Supreme Court refused to approve the Association's certificate on the
grounds that its stated purposes of urging people to support freedom in association and to reject governmental encouragement of either discrimination or
anti-discrimination were contrary to public policy and injurious to the com2
munity, although admittedly not unlawful.
The Appellate Division unanimously dismissed a petition to order the
Supreme Court Justice to revoke his two opinions3 and on appeal this decision
was reversed. The Court of Appeals held, first that "the public policy of the
State is not violated by purposes which are not unlawful. ' 4 This holding makes
1. 9 N.Y.2d 376, 214 N.Y.S.2d 388 (1961). Consolidated with the main case was an
action by the Association pursuant to Article 78 to compel the Secretary of State to file its
unapproved charter application because Section 10 of the Membership Corporation Law
was allegedly unconstitutional. The Supreme Court, New York County, dismissed the
petition because Section 10 was not unconstitutional. Association for the Preservation of
Freedom of Choice v. Simon, 22 Misc. 2d 1016, 201 N.Y.S.2d 135 (Sup. Ct. 1960). The
Appellate Division unanimously affirmed. 11'A.D.2d 927, 206 N.Y.S.2d 532 (1st Dep't 1960).
The Court of Appeals affirmed without discussion.
2.' In 17 Misc. 2d 1012, 187 N.Y.S.2d 706 (Sup. Ct. 1959) at pages 1013 and 707
respectively the Justice said:
In passing upon an application for the approval of a membership corporation, the
duty of the court is not merely to see to it that the requirements of the statute
have been met, but also to judicially determine whether the objects and purposes
of the proposed corporations are lawful, in accord with public policy and not
injurious to the community.
When asked to reconsider he replied in 18 Misc. 2d 534, 188 N.Y.S.2d 885 (Sup. Ct.
1959) at pages 535 and 887 respectively:
Certainly the sponsors of the proposed membership corporation are completely
free to associate for the purposes they spell out in the proposed certificate .... But
they may not compel the state to grant them, for these purposes, the benefits and
privileges of incorporation as a membership corporation.
3. 10 A.D.2d 873, 202 N.Y.S.2d 218 (2d Dep't 1960).
4. 9 N.Y.2d 376, 382, 214 N.Y.S.2d 388, 394 (1961).
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it clear that, in the future, the courts cannot hold, consistently with this decision, that although the purposes of the proposed corporation are not unlawful,
they violate public policy.
Since the Supreme Court had withheld approval of the Association's charter on the alternative grounds that the purposes either violated public policy
or were injurious to the community, or both, the Court of Appeals also held
that "injury to the community" was too vague, indefinite and elusive a standard. Because of the application of this standard, the Court expressed doubts
as to whether the lower courts had constitutionally applied the provisions of
Section 10 and reasoned that if rejections were limited to cases where the purposes were unlawful, those doubts would be resolved.
As far back as 1896 it was held that public policy and public interest
must be considered in deciding whether to approve a charter application. Thus
in In re Agudath Hukehiloth an application was denied approval because its
charter indicated that meetings were to be held on Sunday for the transaction
of business. 5
The ridiculous possibilities of the application of these standards should
have become apparent with the decision in Application of CatalonianNationalist Club of New York. 6 There, the purpose of the charter was to inform the
people of this country about the Catalonian culture. Approval was withheld
because there had been too much teaching of and adherence to foreign culture
and a division of the people into groups might result.
In In re Lithuanian Workers' Literature Soc.7 it was reasoned that the
8
court should not make itself the "censor of tastes, social or political" but
should approve a charter application whenever its purposes and the methods
of carrying out these purposes appear lawful. Nevertheless the courts continued
to refuse approval of charters on public policy and community interest grounds.
Thus, in In re Patriotic Citizenship Ass'n Inc.9 Judge Froessel, who dissented in the present case, followed the reasoning of the earlier decisions and
refused to approve a charter where the purpose of the proposed corporation
was to seek an amendment to the New York Constitution to permit one who
advocated forceful overthrow of the government to be involuntarily deprived
of citizenship. Judge Froessel, who was then a Supreme Court Justice, found
it unthinkable that New York should allow anyone to incorporate for the purS. 18 Misc. 717, 42 N.Y. Supp. 985 (Sup. Ct. 1896). However, even before that case
the Court of Appeals had referred to considerations of public policy in passing on the
legality of charter purposes. In United States Vinegar Co. v. Foehrenbach, 148 N.Y. 58, 42
N.E. 403 (1895) the defendant argued that the plaintiff corporation's purposes were illegal
in an attempt to escape liability on his stock subscription contract. The court found that
the purposes involved were not illegal nor "inconsistent with public policy, as declared by
public law." 148 N.Y. 58, 64,.42 N.E. 403, 403.
6. 112 Misc. 207, 184 N.Y. Supp. 132 (Sup. Ct. 1920).
7. 196 App. Div. 262, 187 N.Y. Supp. 612 (2d Dep't 1921).
8. 196 App. Div. 262, 265, 187 N.Y. Supp. 612, 614 (2d Dep't 1921).
9. 26 Misc. 2d 995, 53 N.Y.S.2d 595 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
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pose of advocating a constitutional amendment of this character. Contrary to
the reasoning in In re Lithuanian Workers' Literatuere Soc. Judge Froessel
apparently based his decision on personal notions of right and wrong.
Other applications have been denied approval for such reasons as: (1) the
name not appropriate in view of the purposes;1 (2) there being too many
12
1
organizations already in the area;' (3) a confusing and misleading name;
(4) the purposes so vague that they might include pernicious lobbying activities.13
As the preceding cases illustrate, the use of these nebulous standards has
led to considerable uncertainty. Thus, it was apparent to the Court of Appeals
that a more definitive standard was necessary.
The statute was clear that only lawfulness of purpose was required. If
the Court had rejected the lower courts' standards of public policy and community interest and at the same time had substituted a new standard which
required more than mere lawfulness of purpose, such action would have been
labeled legislation. The Court thus limited its decision to rejection of the
previous public policy and community interest standards.
The statute is now open to new interpretation. To compensate for this
judicial directive not to use the previous standards which gave the justices
broad discretion, the lower courts are now very likely to interpret "lawful" in
its broadest sense. It is likely that approval will be withheld if the purpose,
although admittedly within the letter of the law, is not within its spirit.
The two dissenting judges held that refusals to approve were desirable
in at least some instances where there is only a violation of public policy.
In support of this position they cited Article I, Section 2 of the New York
Constitution which in broad terms prohibits discrimination by any person, firm
14
or arm of the State because of race, color, creed or religion. This provision
does not create any new civil rights but is merely authority for their creation.',
Pointing out that the Legislature had not enacted penal statutes in all
those instances permitted by the constitution,' 6 it was argued that discrimina10. In re Mazzini Cultural Center, Inc., 185 Misc. 1031, 58 N.Y.S.2d 529 (Sup. Ct.
1945).
11. In re Victory Committee of Greenpoint of Patriotic Social & Fraternal Club, Inc.,
59 N.Y.S.2d 546 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
12. Application of Stillwell Political Club, Inc., 109 N.Y.S.2d 331 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
13. In the Matter of the Certificate of Incorporation of Council for Small Business,
Inc., 155 N.Y.S.2d 530 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
14. N.Y. Const. art. I, § 2:
No person shall be denied equal protection of the laws of this state or any subdivision thereof. No person shall, because of race, color, creed or religion, be
subjected to any discrimination in his civil rights by any other person or by any
firm, corporation, or institution or by the state or any agency or subdivision of
the state.
15. Kemp v. Rubin, 188 Misc. 310, 69 N.Y.S.2d 680 (Sup. Ct. 1947), aff'd, 273 App.
Div. 789, 75 N.Y.S.2d 768, rev'd on other grounds, 298 N.Y. 590, 81 N.E.2d 325 (1948).
16. See the N.Y. Penal Law § 514 (public employment and public accommodations
among others); § 515 (class or price discrimination in admission); § 700 (discrimination
by firms, corporations, institutions or the State).
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tion clearly against public policy but not violating a criminal statute, could
occur. Such discrimination would be against public policy but not unlawful.
It was reasoned that if discretion were allowed in such cases, there could be
little objection.
The majority opinion, however, limits the courts to considerations of
lawfulness only in deciding whether to approve charter applications under Section 10 of the Membership Corporations Law. This limitation will prohibit the
use of personal standards and lead to consistency, a reform 'long overdue.
P. D.C.
"CONTINUING WRONG" THEORY ADOPTED IN ACTION FOR INADEQUATE FREIGHT

RATES
In Ripley v. InternationalRailways of CentralAmerica, the minority stockholders of International Railways (hereafter referred to as Irca) brought suit
on behalf of the corporation against the United Fruit Company (hereafter described as United).17 United was in practical control of Irca by virtue of a
voting trust created in 1928;18 consequently it (United) was in a fiduciary
relationship to the minority stockholders of Irca. Damages are based on allegedly inadequate freight rates for hauling United's bananas from the interior of
Guatemala to the coast.
In 1936, Irca, United and Compania Agricola de Guatemala (hereafter described as Agricola), a subsidiary of United, entered into business arrangements
which were controlled by ten contracts each relating to different aspects of the
parties' business dealings. One of these contracts, entitled "Main Agreement,"
was approved by the stockholders of Irca. This agreement contained terms by
which Agricola helped Irca finance new equipment and obtain certain other
operating benefits. Agricola received notes and Irca stock in exchange. Agricola
also agreed to use the main lines of Irca to transport its bananas and supplies,
"under such arrangements as the parties hereto may agree upon from time
to time."
The "Trackage" and "Operation of Trains" agreements were executed at
the same time, but they were not submitted to the stockholders of Irca. These
agreements "fixed" the total cost to Agricola for shipping a carload of bananas
at $60.00; whereas, a similar haul would cost an independent producer $130.00
after 1939.
The referee awarded damages to the plaintiffs for the difference between
the rates paid and the fair and reasonable value of the transportation. Recovery was limited to the six year period preceding the commencement of the
0
action. 9 The referee's determinations were affirmed by the Appellate Division.
The Court of Appeals, two judges dissenting, affirmed the judgment.
17. 8 N.Y.2d 430, 209 N.Y.S.2d 289 (1960).

18. Ripley v. International Railways of Central America, 276 App. Div. 1006, 95

N.Y.S.2d 871 (1st Dep't 1950).
19. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 48.
20. 8 A.D.2d 310, 188 N.Y.S.2d 62 (1st Dep't 1959).
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